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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under Idaho law, this is a contract case stemming from implied warranty. This is not a tort 
case and is not a matter of first impression. The issues presented were decided thirty years ago 
when the Court decided Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987) (holding 
that warranty claims sound in contract, not tort). The Court should affirm. 
The case involves a lake home built on Lake Payette in McCall, Idaho. Chris Kirk ("Kirk") 
built the home for Nancy Gentry-Boyd ("Gentry-Boyd") under an oral contract in 2005. After 
living in the home for nearly seven years without incident, Gentry-Boyd sold the home to Petrus 
in 2012. In 2014, Petrus sued Kirk, Gentry-Boyd, and others alleging that the home was 
uninhabitable due to a latent defect involving water damage beneath the deck. Three of four 
defendants filed for summary judgment. The district court awarded Kirk summary judgment on 
Petrus' implied warranty of habitability claim, ruling that the claim was time barred and citing 
Tusch. Shortly after summary judgment and very close to trial, Petrus settled in mediation with the 
other parties and then filed this appeal against Kirk. 
Through this appeal, Petrus asks the Court to transmute his breach of implied warranty of 
habitability claim from contract to tort, so he can escape application of the contract statute of 
limitations that barred him from proceeding against Kirk below. For good reasons, this should not 
happen. The district court carefully considered Petrus' arguments that a breach of implied warranty 
of habitability claim sounds in tort, not contract, and the corollary that a tort statute of limitations 
applies, not contract. The district court analyzed and rejected these arguments twice: first on 
summary judgment, then again following Petrus' request for reconsideration. Both times, the 
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district court concluded that Petrus' arguments misread controlling Idaho law. We agree. 
In concluding that Petrus was incorrect in both instances, the district court analyzed the 
language of the controlling cases, considered the respective history and development of those 
cases, and considered the policy implications. The district court correctly concluded that, 
consistent with this Court's precedent, an implied warranty of habitability claim sounds in contract, 
and a contract statute of limitations controls. Further, the district court opined that even if it had 
accepted Petrus' incorrect contention that the implied warranty of habitability claim was a tort 
claim, the economic loss doctrine would prevent Petrus from recovering economic damages. 
Resultantly, we ask that the Court affirm the lower court's decision in favor of Kirk. The state of 
the law in Idaho is fair and on solid ground. Idaho homebuyers are not suffering from catastrophic 
damages without recourse as Petrus contends, and there is no compelling reason to change existing 
Idaho law. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This civil appeal is before the Court because under the timeline and facts of this case, Petrus 
has no viable legal theory against Kirk. Petrus initially sued Kirk for negligence. He dropped this 
claim in his First Amended Complaint and added two new counts: (I) conspiracy to commit fraud 
and (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability. At the summary judgment hearing, Petrus 
conceded that he had no supporting evidence and acceded to entry of summary judgment on his 
frivolous conspiracy claim. This left his implied warranty claim. After hearing argument from both 
sides, the district court granted Kirk summary judgment on the implied warranty claim, holding 
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that the applicable statute of limitations had run and the claim was time barred. Petrus appealed 
that decision. 
In reaching its decision on summary judgment, the district court properly treated the statute 
of limitations holding as dispositive and ended its analysis. The district court did not consider any 
of Kirk's additional arguments in support of summary judgment. These additional arguments, 
combined with the fact that the economic loss doctrine prevents Petrus from recovering against 
Kirk even if successful on appeal, illustrate the frivolous nature of this appeal. An appeal without 
hope of recovery lacks sense. In this light, we invite the Court to consider these additional 
arguments and consider awarding Kirk fees for defending this appeal. 
The final issue addressed in this brief is Kirk's appeal of the district court's decision 
apportioning fees to Kirk. The district court specifically held that after carefully reviewing Kirk's 
itemization of attorney fees, pertinent portions of the record, and the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3), the court arrived at a reasonable apportionment. The court opined that it perceived the 
work incurred by Kirk's attorneys in defending against Petrus' frivolous conspiracy-to-defraud 
claim also necessary to defend against the implied-warranty claim. The court stated the two were 
indivisible. However, these statements do not comport with the court's actions. In apportioning 
fees to Kirk, the district court apportioned Kirk less than seven percent of the total fees incurred. 
For this, we ask the Court to remand the district court's decision on apportionment of fees to Kirk 
with instruction to review and reapportion the fee award consistent with an exercise of reason and 
applicable law. 
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2. Statement of Facts 
In reviewing Appellants' Opening Brief, we agree that the district court fairly considered 
the facts on summary judgment. However, outside of simply calculating a timeline indicating when 
Kirk completed construction and when Gentry-Boyd sold the home to Petrus, some additional facts 
may assist the Court. In her seven years of ownership, Gentry-Boyd never experienced water 
problems with the house. R. Vol. 1, p. 223, L 130:10-11; p. 228, L 150:10-17; L 152:16-19; p. 229 
L 154:21-22; L 155:15-19; p. 233 L 171:1-3. Petrus's expert testified at his deposition that none 
of the problems he discovered or repaired affected the home's habitability. R. Vol. 1, p. 391, L 
145:12-22. Petrus testified that his damages were all purely economic damages and consisted of 
the repair costs, possible loss of use, and possible lost rent. R. Vol. 1, pp. 301-303, L 180:22-188-
10. In August 2013, Petrus, through counsel, sent Kirk a notice letter under the Notice and 
Opportunity to Repair Act complaining of problems with the home's south-facing French doors. 
R. Vol. 1, pp. 871-872. Shortly thereafter, Kirk arranged and conducted an inspection of the doors. 
Kirk, through counsel, responded to Petrus' letter and reported a number of problems with the 
doors. R. Vol. 1, pp. 117-119. Kirk denied responsibility for the door problems and carefully listed 
in his response letter what he noticed was wrong with the door. Specifically, he mentioned: 
• The locking mechanism on the operable door had been removed and reinstalled in an 
inappropriate manner; 
• The locking mechanism on the stationary door had been pried to the extent that it was 
not functional; 
• Markings on the overhead trim board indicated that the locking mechanism was 
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engaged to lock when someone had tried to close the door; 
• Weather stripping on the astragal of the operable door had been completely removed; 
• Weather stripping on the bottom of the operable door had been trimmed and was not 
intact; 
• Weather stripping on the stationary door could not be verified or inspected because the 
door would not open; 
• Non-factory screws were installed into the threshold and not in the correct area, several 
screws had been added to the threshold, especially to the weep channel; 
• The ice and water shield installed in the crawl space had been altered and displaced; 
and, 
• The foam insulation had been removed. 
R. Vol. 1, pp. 117-119, 563-564. 
During this visit, Kirk limited his inspection to the French doors as the notice letter 
specified was the problem. R. Vol. 1, p. 564. Petrus later invited Kirk back to the property to 
inspect more than just the doors. R. Vol. 1, p. 564-565. In the spring of 2014, during a second visit 
and prior to demolition, Petrus allowed Kirk to inspect the crawlspace, interior, and French doors, 
but prevented Kirk from inspecting the home's roof, gutter system, and exterior. R. Vol. 1, p. 564. 
Petrus stopped the inspection and ordered Kirk to leave with the threat of calling the Sheriff if Kirk 
did not leave. R. Vol. 1, p. 564. Kirk attended social functions at the home between 2005 and 2009 
and witnessed no problems with the French doors. R. Vol. 1, p. 565. Kirk's first inspection of the 
home revealed that at some point after construction was completed, the home had been severely 
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altered and damaged. R. Vol. 1, p. 565. Petrus contractually waived the implied warranty of 
habitability in his purchase contract with Gentry-Boyd. R. Vol. 1, p. 482, L. 39. 
3. Course of Proceedings 
Petrus filed suit against Kirk, Gentry-Boyd, and others on March 11, 2014. R. Vol. 1, pp. 
15-27. The original Complaint asserted negligence against Kirk. R. Vol. 1, pp. 21-23. On 
September 8, 2014, Petrus filed his First Amended Complaint. R. Vol. 1, pp. 28-43. Against Kirk, 
this complaint asserted breach of the implied warranty of habitability and conspiracy to commit 
fraud. R. Vol. 1, pp. 36-39. The negligence claim against Kirk was not included in the First 
Amended Complaint. On September 21, 2015, Petrus filed a Second Amended Complaint. R. Vol. 
1, pp. 71-90. This complaint reasserted the two claims from the first amendment against Kirk. R. 
Vol. 1, pp. 80-82. Kirk filed for summary judgment on May 20, 2016. During the summary 
judgment hearing, Petrus conceded that he had no supporting evidence to continue with the 
conspiracy to commit fraud claim against Kirk and acceded to entry of summary judgment on that 
claim. On July 7, 2016, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, awarding 
summary judgment to Kirk on the implied warranty of habitability claim. R. Vol. 1, pp. 967-997. 
The district court determined that the claim sounds in contract, subjecting it to I.C. § 5-241(b)'s 
completion-of-construction accrual rule, as well as J.C. § 5-21 Ts four-year statute of limitations 
based on oral contract. Based on this ruling, the Judgment was entered for Kirk on November 15, 
2016. R. Vol. 1, pp. 1003-1005. Petrus filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 28, 2016. 
R. Vol. 1, pp. 1006-1008. The district court denied that motion on December 5, 2016. R. Vol. 1, 
pp. 1069-1075. On November 29, 2016, Kirk filed a request for attorney fees and award of costs. 
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R. Vol. 1, pp. 1025-1027. Petrus filed an objection on December 13, 2016 and a Notice of Appeal 
on January 13, 2017. R. Vol. 1, pp. 1076-1087, 1092-1096. A hearing on the attorney fee motion 
was held on February 6, 2017. On February 13, 2017, the district court issued its Order Awarding 
Costs and Attorney Fees. R. Vol. 1, pp. 1150-1157. Also on February 13, 2017, the court issued 
an Amended Judgment. R. Vol. 1, pp. 1158-1159. On March 7, 2017, Petrus filed an Amended 
Notice of Appeal. R. Vol. l, pp. 1160-1165. On March 23, 2017, Kirk filed a Notice of Cross-
Appeal. R. Vol. 1, pp. 1177-1181. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Examined as a whole, is Petrus barred from recovering against Kirk by reasons of 
waiver, statutory non-compliance, and the economic loss doctrine, such that this 
appeal is frivolous and entitles Kirk to fees on appeal because, even if the Court 
decides that a claim for breach of implied warranty of habitability claim sounds in 
tort, Petrus cannot recover against Kirk? 
2. Did the district court err in its apportionment of attorney fees to Kirk? 
IV. STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY 
Kirk asserts the first issue presented on appeal under Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(4) and 
35(b )( 4) as additional or subsidiary issues. Kirk asserts the second issue presented on appeal as a 
cross-appeal of the district court's Order Awarding Costs and Attorney Fees and Amended 
Judgment entered on February 13, 2017, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11. Kirk timely filed a 
Notice of Cross-Appeal on March 23, 2017. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the summary judgment decision below. Absent a tolling statute, a 
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statute of limitations acts as an absolute bar against an action. Because no tolling statute applies to 
Petrus' breach of implied warranty of habitability claim, and because the claim sounds in contract, 
Petrus' claim is time barred. 
VI. APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We agree that free review is the appropriate standard for the questions presented by Petrus, 
however, we would ask the Court to review carefully the legal analysis conducted by the district 
court in reaching its conclusion that Petrus' argument fails. Additionally, we would ask the Court 
to remain mindful of the doctrine of stare decisis in considering Petrus' argument that Idaho law 
has been incorrect for the past thirty years. 
The appropriate standard of review for examining the district court's decision in 
apportioning attorney fees to Kirk is "abuse of discretion" and requires a three-pronged inquiry. 
Because an award of attorney fees is a discretionary decision, on review we examine the trial 
court's decision to determine whether it correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and reached 
its decision by an exercise ofreason. Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 193, 191 P.3d 1107, 1113 (Ct. 
App. 2008). 
VII. ARGUMENT 
1. The district court correctly rejected Petrus' argument that a claim for breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability sounds in tort, not contract. 
LC. § 5-241 (b) states that, "[ c ]ontract actions shall accrue and the applicable limitation 
statute shall begin to run at the time of final completion of construction of such an improvement 
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[to real property.]" Id In contrast, LC. § 5-241 (a) states that, "[t]ort actions, if not previously 
accrued, shall accrue and the applicable limitation statute shall begin to run six ( 6) years after the 
final completion of construction of such an improvement [to real property.]" Id. These statutes are 
clear on their face. They distinguish the application of contract and tort statutes of limitations in 
the context of improvements to real property. They drive a large part of the analysis in this appeal. 
The statute specifically states: 
Actions will be deemed to have accrued and the statute of limitations shall begin to 
run as to actions against any person by reason of his having performed or furnished 
the design, planning, supervision or construction of an improvement to real 
property, as follows: 
(a) Tort actions, if not previously accrued, shall accrue and the applicable limitation 
statute shall begin to run six ( 6) years after the final completion of construction of 
such an improvement. 
(b) Contract actions shall accrue and the applicable limitation statute shall begin to 
run at the time of final completion of construction of such an improvement. 
The times fixed by these sections shall not be asserted by way of defense by any 
person in actual possession or control, as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of such an 
improvement at the time any deficiency in such an improvement constitutes the 
proximate cause of an injury or death for which it is proposed to bring an action. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the 
laws of this state for the bringing of any action .... Idaho Code Ann. § 5-241. 
Section (a) of the statute controls tort claims and section (b) controls contract claims. For 
his claim to have any fighting chance of survival, Petrus has to argue that his implied warranty of 
habitability claim against Kirk sounds in tort. If he argues otherwise, he loses, and the claim does 
not survive application of this statute. 
In reaching its decisions favoring Kirk on this issue, both on summary judgment and 
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reconsideration, the district court analyzed these statutes along with the Idaho cases that have 
considered their application; namely, Tusch. The time line in Tusch is condensed into three years, 
whereas, the timeline in our case is closer to nine. Coffin completed building the duplexes for the 
Vander Boeghs in 1976. Id., at 1024. Three years later, in 1979, the Vander Boeghs sold the 
duplexes to Tusch Enterprises. One month later the walls started cracking and the windows and 
doors would not close properly. Id., at 1025. In our case, Gentry-Boyd owned and lived in the 
home from 2005 to 2012. Petrus discovered the dry rot he complained of a year and a half after his 
purchase from Gentry-Boyd in late 2013. Given the timeframe in Tusch, the court there did not 
have to consider the statute of limitations question directly because it was not at issue. Here, the 
district court analyzed the timing question very carefully. 
The district court correctly stated the Kirk and Petrus disagreed as to when purchasers of 
the home Kirk built lost the ability to sue Kirk for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 1107. It compared the arguments made by Kirk and Petrus and agreed the Kirk had 
the better argument. Beginning with a discussion of the role of privity of contract, the district court 
properly explained that Petrus did not lose on summary judgment because of a lack of privity 
between Petrus and Kirk. R. Vol. 1, p. 1107. The court dissected Tusch and concluded that a claim 
for breach of implied warranty of habitability was clearly, or at least readily inferable, from Tusch, 
a contract claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 1108. The district court stated: 
In not requiring privity, the court [in Tusch] didn't suggest privity need not be 
required because the claim wasn't contractual in nature. To the contrary, the court 
plainly regarded the claim as contractual in nature. In that regard, the court 
observed, first, that the purpose of the "economic loss rule" is "to allow the law of 
contracts to resolve disputes concerning economic losses" and, second, that 
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"[i]f ... the area of pure economic losses, negligence is to be preempted by contract 
principles, ... then contract principles must be given a freer hand to deal with 
injuries the law has typically redressed." Id. ( emphasis added). 
R. Vol. I, p. II 08-1109. 
The district court went on to explain: "Thus, by not requiring privity, the court deliberately 
made a contract action available to 'deal with' injuries for which there was ~o tort remedy in light 
of the 'economic loss rule."' The court's intention to authorize a contract action is made quite clear 
in the Opinion's footnote 8. There the court quoted the recommendation of the venerable treatise 
The Law of Torts by Prosser and Keeton to eliminate the privity requirement to allow "recovery 
on a contract-warranty theory:" 
Historically, ... the only tort action available to a disappointed purchaser suffering 
intangible commercial loss has been the tort action of deceit for fraud and the only 
contract action has been for breach of warranty, express or implied. This remains 
the generally accepted view. A few courts in recent years have permitted either a 
tort action for negligence or one in strict liability. Usually, the reason for so doing 
has been to escape the requirement of privity of contract as a prerequisite to 
recovery on a warranty theory. But the elimination of this requirement for recovery 
on a contract-warranty theory would seem to constitute the more satisfactory 
technique. 
Tusch, at 50 n.8 (quoting Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts,§ 101 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes 
omitted)). R. Vol. I, p. I 109. 
The court characterized this treatise as "respected authority" and indisputably followed its 
recommendation. Id R. Vol. 1, p. 1109. 
The district court echoed this analysis for Petrus a second time in its Order Denying Motion 
for Reconsideration. There, the court stated that, "had the Tusch court's intention been to recognize 
a new tort claim, eliminating the privity requirement wouldn't have been necessary, as privity of 
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contract isn't a requirement of tort law." R. Vol. 1, p. 1137. It went on to explain that the legislature 
has the power to adopt an accrual rule that has the effect of rendering an implied warranty of 
habitability claim unavailable to a subsequent home purchaser who purchases several years after 
completion of construction. R. Vol. 1, p. 1138. The district court's analysis is sound. It creates 
ample support to logically conclude in Kirk's favor and affirm the decision below. 
2. Idaho's economic loss rule bars Petrus from recovering against Kirk because all of 
Petrus' damages are pure economic loss. 
Our case involves a residential home constructed by Kirk in 2005 with modem building 
techniques and modem materials. This is not a products liability case involving personal injury, a 
strict liability claim involving property damage, or a UCC sales case involving goods. Petrus did 
not suffer personal injury or damage to any other property besides the home he purchased. This 
fact alone implicates the economic loss doctrine and further stands in the way of Petrus recovering 
anything from Kirk. 
Tusch Enterprises sued Coffin for both negligent construction and breach of implied 
warranty of habitability. Petrus also sued Kirk for both. Petrus sued Kirk for negligence in his 
original complaint and then amended to sue Kirk for breach of implied warranty of habitability. 
The Tusch court held that that negligence claim was barred by the "economic loss rule," which 
prohibits recovering purely economic losses -- a category into which the damage to the duplexes 
fell on a negligence theory. The Tusch court also held that the claim for implied warranty of 
habitability survived the "economic loss rule." This is consistent with the fact that the Tusch court 
viewed that claim as a contract claim. Without knowing what prompted Petrus to drop the 
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negligence claim against Kirk, one might surmise it was the realization that the economic loss 
doctrine would prevent recovery. This highlights the untenable argument Petrus makes that his 
appeal has merit. If the district court is correct in its analysis and conclusion that a claim for breach 
of implied warranty of habitability is a contract claim, Petrus is time barred and this Court should 
affirm. If Petrus is successful in convincing the Court that the district court got it wrong, and a 
claim for breach of implied warranty of habitability is a tort claim, this Court should rule that 
Petrus is precluded from recovery by the economic loss doctrine. This conundrum is 
insurmountable for Petrus. 
As touched on above, the economic loss rule in Idaho is seemingly simple: absent personal 
injury or property damage, recovery is not available in tort. Tort damages come in three varieties: 
personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. Dale D. Goble, All Along the Watchtower: 
Economic Loss in Tort (the Idaho Case Law), 34 Idaho L. Rev. 225, 234 (1998). Petrus' damages 
all add up to economic loss. The facts, coupled with his deposition testimony on damages establish 
this. R. Vol. 1, pp. 301-303, L 180:22-188-10. He suffered water damage to some boards beneath 
the deck of his home. The home was the subject of the sale transaction and, thus, his only damage 
is pure economic damage, not recoverable in tort. 
The Court in Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 
( 1995) defined the economic loss rule and its nuance. In Duffin, the Court stated that economic 
loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property. Duffin at 1007. The 
Court went on to state: 
We have defined "economic loss" as including "costs of repair and replacement of 
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defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial 
loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers 
Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 
309 (1975) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds. Conversely, "property loss" 
encompasses "damage to property other than that which is the subject of the 
transaction." Id See also Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41, 740 P.2d 
l 022, 1026 (1987); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 
1349, 1350 (1984); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 332, 581 
P.2d 784, 790 (1978). Since the losses claimed here are purely economic, this 
exception is inapplicable. 
Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995). 
Petrus cannot escape application of the economic loss rule if the Court finds that his claim 
for breach of implied warranty of habitability sounds in tort. 
3. Petrus's failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites to filing suit under Idaho's 
Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act required dismissal of his claims against Kirk. 
As argued below but not considered, any action commenced by a claimant prior to 
compliance with the requirements of Idaho's Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act ("NORA") 
shall be dismissed by the court without prejudice and may not be recommenced until the claimant 
has complied with the requirements of this section. I.C. § 6-2503. In short, compliance is an 
absolute prerequisite to filing suit. Here, Petrus failed to comply with the NORA prior to 
commencing suit. 
Petrus attempted to comply by providing Kirk with notice in 2013 that there was a problem 
with the south-facing French doors of the Home. Petrus invited Kirk to inspect the doors. Kirk 
inspected the doors and reported to Petrus his findings. Because Kirk's findings at the time did not 
indicate to Kirk any evidence of a construction defect, he denied responsibility for the cause, but 
outlined to Petrus all of what he saw during his inspection. 
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The failure and statutory breach came when Petrus filed his Complaint in March 2014, 
alleging much more than just a problem with the French doors. The Complaint alleges the presence 
of mold in the crawlspace and significant damaged caused by moisture related to the water damage 
below. These allegations were much broader than those included in the August 7, 2013, notice 
letter to Kirk. The allegation of mold damage was significant because it could indicate personal 
injury and structural catastrophe requiring very expensive remediation or demolition of the entire 
home. 
After improperly filing his Complaint, in violation of the statutory requirements, Petrus 
invited Kirk out to inspect the Home a second time, in April 2014, because the problems with the 
home were greater than just the French doors. During this second inspection, Kirk, as the person 
who built the Home and was intimately familiar with what went into its construction, wanted to 
climb onto the roof, inspect the gutters that had been installed after Gentry-Boyd sold the Home, 
and look at the entire exterior of the Home. Petrus prevented Kirk from doing so. He allowed Kirk 
to inspect the crawlspace and interior of the Home, but stopped the inspection short and demanded 
that Kirk leave the property or he would call the sheriff when Kirk wanted to inspect the other 
areas of the Home. This action by Petrus effectively denied Kirk the opportunity to complete an 
inspection in accordance with NORA. The filing of suit claiming excessive damage outside the 
scope of the August 7, 2013, notice letter, prior to allowing Kirk a second opportunity to inspect 
the Home, violates the statutory prerequisites and should result in bar to suit against Kirk. 
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4. As the homebuilder, Kirk is the only logical beneficiary of Petrus' waiver of the 
implied warranty of habitability in the purchase and sale contract between Petrus 
and Gentry-Boyd. 
Petrus knowingly waived the implied warranty of habitability against Gentry-Boyd through 
the clear language of the Purchase and Sale Agreement at paragraph 39. The Section 39 disclaimer 
in the Purchase and Sale Agreement stated as follows: 
ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the 
Parties respecting the matters herein set forth and supersedes all prior agreements 
between the parties respecting such matters. No warranties, including without 
limitation, any warranty of habitability, agreements or representations not expressly 
set forth herein shall be binding on either party. 
Idaho permits disclaimer of an implied warranty of habitability, provided the disclaimer is 
clear and unambiguous. Tusch, Idaho 113 at 45. As a seasoned attorney, trained to read and 
understand contract provisions, Petrus should be held to the clear and unambiguous waiver of any 
implied warranty of habitability claim. This waiver of the warranty against the seller flows to the 
benefit of the builder as a third-party beneficiary to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Given the 
nature of a warranty of habitability, as a builder warranty, and not a seller warranty, the waiver 
language included in the sale contract contemplates and ultimately benefits the builder. 
The waiver language of the sale contract states in part that, "No warranties, including, 
without limitation, any warranty of habitability, agreements or representations not expressly set 
forth herein shall be binding on either party." Under Idaho law [1.C. § 29-102], if a party can 
demonstrate that a contract was made expressly for its benefit, it may enforce that contract, prior 
to rescission, as a third-party beneficiary. The test for determining a party's status as a third-party 
beneficiary capable of properly invoking the protection of I.C. § 29-102, is whether the agreement 
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reflects an intent to benefit the third party. Am. W. Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 
752, 316 P.3d 662,668 (2013). Again, because a warranty of habitability is a builder warranty, 
made at the time a builder builds a new home for a first-resident buyer, the inclusion of language 
waiving this warranty in a sale contract between the first buyer, who was not also the builder, and 
a subsequent buyer, indicates the intent to benefit the third-party builder because the warranty 
doesn't exist between the seller and buyer unless the seller also built the home. Thus, the original 
builder is the only party the warranty waiver can benefit. Because of this, the Court should consider 
this in determining yet another reason why Petrus could not recover against Kirk. 
5. The history of implied warranty and out of state authority recited by Petrus offers 
the Court no help in deciding this case. 
Nowhere in the analysis of this case is it necessary to consider the multitude of unrelated 
cases Dean Prosser considered when penning his 1960 Yale Law Journal article. Those cases 
involved food and drink, automobiles, tires, pumps, insecticides, antifreeze compounds, electric 
blankets, insulating materials, lumber, furnaces, and portable elevators, yet provided no guidance 
about how to answer the question at issue involving a modem lake home in McCall, Idaho. While 
the history of implied warranty is mildly interesting, it does little to help the Court. Neither do the 
Texas and Illinois cases from the 1970's and 1980's Petrus cites. While these cases do show 
examples where courts decided not to apply a contract statute of limitations to an implied warranty 
claim, they do not help answer the question at hand. The answer is much closer. Looking to the 
Idaho statutes and this Court's established precedent provides the answer. The answer is not to 
create a new tort cause of action in Idaho. 
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6. Idaho policy reasons favor limiting a builder's liability for breach of implied 
warranty of habitability to that of the contract statute of limitations period. 
In terms of public policy, consistent with the policy ideal of protecting modem 
homebuyers, even remote buyers, from the sophistication employed in modem construction, is the 
policy consideration that modem homebuilders not be held accountable on their projects forever, 
or even for a decade. Once the builder completes the project, the buyer moves in and becomes 
responsible for upkeep and maintenance. In this case, we are talking about a house built on the 
lake in McCall. McCall winters are harsh. There is typically lots of snow and perfect conditions 
for forming ice, hence the popularity of the McCall Winter Carnival and ice-sculpting contest. It 
is typical for many residents to remove the snow and ice from their roofs multiple times each 
winter. Some install electric heat tape to keep their gutters functional. If homeowners do not 
employ these preventative measures consistently year after year, problems can arise. Problems like 
the one in this case. Four or five years of poor upkeep and failed snow and ice removal can certainly 
lead to snow and ice melting and causing damage. This damage could occur even in a perfectly 
built home, a standard to which builders are not held. Thus, when comparing the realities of 
responsible modem building and the realities of responsible modem homeownership, it is entirely 
reasonable from a policy standpoint to limit a builder's responsibility under a contract-warranty 
theory to four (oral contract) or five (written contract) years. This becomes especially true given 
the challenge that Mother Nature provides to builders building in Idaho's harsh winter 
environment. The Idaho legislature understood this dynamic when drafting I.C. § 5-241. 
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7. By acknowledging that the time spent defending against the frivolous and non-
frivolous claims was indivisible, then awarding Kirk less than seven percent of his 
total fees incurred, the district court failed to reach its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
A court does not abuse its discretion so long as it "perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards; 
and reached the decision by an exercise of reason." Anderson v. Good/iffe, 140 Idaho 446, 450, 
P.3d 64, 68 (2004). "An award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 is discretionary; but it must be 
supported by findings and those findings, in turn, must be supported by the record." Wing v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106Idaho905, 910-11, 684 P.2d 307, 312-13 (IdahoCt. App. 
1984)(citing Bosshardt, 104 Idaho at 660,662 P.2d at 241). Because "the court's findings contain 
a mixture of a legal conclusion and the judge's subjective impression of the landowner's motive 
for litigating this case," they will not be reversed unless the trial court has abused its discretion. 
Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 927, 908 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Idaho 1995). Hon. 
Jesse R. Walters, Jr., A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, 38 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 24 (2001). 
In its Order Awarding Costs and Attorney Fees, the district court specifically stated that 
although a precise apportionment is not possible, after carefully reviewing Kirk's itemization of 
his attorney fees, after reviewing the other pertinent portions of the record, and after considering 
the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), the court arrived at one that is reasonable in its judgment. 
R. Vol. l,p.1155. 
The court explained that Petrus' conspiracy claim against Kirk "borders on preposterous" 
and declared it to have been brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
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foundation. R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. The court went to explain that in its view Petrus' breach of implied 
warranty of habitability claim against Kirk raised issues of first impression and, therefore, was not 
frivolous. The court decided that one claim was frivolous and one was not. In deciding how to 
apportion fees to Kirk for the work done in defending against the frivolous claim, the court 
explained that its aim in the apportionment process was to arrive at an award of attorney fees that 
approximates the amount by which Kirk's attorney fees were increased due to Petrus' pursuit of 
the frivolous claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. 
Next, the court explains how it viewed the work done defending the two claims. Making 
two contradictory statements that do not add up to an exercise in reason, the court stated that it 
perceived almost all the work that was necessary to defend against the conspiracy to defraud claim 
to also have been necessary to defend against the implied warranty claim. R. Vol. l, p. 1155. Next, 
it stated that most of the work performed pertained to both claims indivisibly. R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. 
If the court viewed all the work necessary to defend the conspiracy claim as necessary to defend 
the warranty claim, and the work performed to be indivisible, the opposite was also true. The work 
necessary to defend the warranty claim was also necessary to defend the frivolous claim. Counsel 
had to conduct research and discovery for both claims, draft pleadings, attend depositions, prepare 
a summary judgment brief on both issues, and then prepare for and attend a summary judgment 
hearing for both claims, all while attempting to settle and prepare for trial behind the scenes. Petrus 
did not concede the frivolous conspiracy claim until pressed by counsel during the summary 
judgment hearing. 
The court's award of fees to Kirk amounted to less than seven percent of the total fees 
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incurred. No exercise of reason, using the approach explained, results in an award of less than 
seven percent of the total fees incurred. The court stated that it felt justified in its apportionment 
for the additional reason that Petrus' implied warranty claim failed based on a statute of limitations 
defense that could have been raised much earlier in the course of litigation and obviated the need 
to litigate that claim any further. R. Vol. l, p. 1156. Not filing a preliminary motion to dismiss 
either of these claims was a strategic decision, and not one the district court should make. First, 
preliminary motions to dismiss have a low success rate. Second, knowing the attitude of the 
plaintiffs and their counsel, a successful motion to dismiss would have almost guaranteed an appeal 
by Petrus. Substituting its judgment for that of counsel, the district court chose to punish Kirk by 
awarding him less than seven percent of his fees for defending against one frivolous claim and one 
claim involving issues of first impression. Regarding the frivolous claim, counsel became aware 
through discovery that it appeared the evidence to support such a claim did not exist. However, 
rather than go through the trouble of filing a separate motion to dismiss and a motion for summary 
judgment, at that point in the litigation, counsel decided to file one motion. In addition, as counsel 
admitted during the fee hearing, given the preposterous nature of Petrus' conspiracy claim, counsel 
made the strategic decision that if this case were to go to trial, the jury should hear evidence on 
just how preposterous the conspiracy claim was. This decision should not have been made by the 
court and Kirk should not have been punished by the court's lack of an exercise in reason in 
apportioning the fee award. 
Given the court's view of the two claims filed by Petrus against Kirk, and the work 
performed by Kirk's counsel in defending both claims, we ask that this Court remand this issue 
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back to the lower court for further analysis and a reapportionment of the fee award consistent with 
an exercise of reason in light of the fact that this case involved multi-year litigation pursued by 
overly litigious plaintiffs. 
8. As indicated by the arguments presented above, even if Petrus succeeds on appeal 
and the Court remands this case for further proceedings, Petrus cannot recover 
against Kirk and, therefore, Kirk should be awarded fees on appeal. 
An award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate where the appellate court is left with an 
abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation. Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445,449, 797 P.2d 153, 157 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Filing and pursuing an appeal with no hope of prevailing below if successful on remand 
defines an appeal that was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. 
Petrus has made no showing that the district court misapplied the law in reaching its conclusion 
that Petrus' implied warranty of habitability claims was time barred. Petrus' argument is not a 
good-faith argument for the extension or modification of the law. Instead, it is simply an attempt 
to drag out the inevitable and force Kirk to incur more fees. Tusch is well-settled law, as is the 
ability for this Court to award fees on appeal. Kirk respectfully requests that the Court consider 
the overall facts and circumstances presented by Petrus on appeal and accordingly award fees to 
Kirk. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Kirk prevailed on summary judgment below because the district court held that Petrus was 
time barred under I.C. § 5-241. Petrus refuses to accept this fate. Instead, he has filed this appeal 
with hopes of convincing the Court to change existing law simply to serve his limited interest. The 
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Comt should pass on thi s invitation. Petrus has failed to provide ample support or reason to change 
the law. The Court should affirm the decision below. We urge the Court not to stray from 
established precedent that has provided predictability and readily served Idaho builders and 
homeowners for thirty years. 
Finally, we urge the Court to remand the district court's apportionment of fees fo r further 
review and application of reason in calculating a fee award that is consistent with the efforts Kirk 
put forth defending against Petrus' frivolity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DA TED this 15th day of September, 20 17. 
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